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Abstract. In search for a foundational framework for reasoning about observable behav-
ior of programs that may not terminate, we have previously devised a trace-based big-step
semantics for While. In this semantics, both traces and evaluation (relating initial states
of program runs to traces they produce) are defined coinductively. On terminating runs,
this semantics agrees with the standard inductive state-based semantics. Here we present
a Hoare logic counterpart of our coinductive trace-based semantics and prove it sound and
complete. Our logic subsumes the standard partial-correctness state-based Hoare logic as
well as the total-correctness variation: they are embeddable. In the converse direction,
projections can be constructed: a derivation of a Hoare triple in our trace-based logic can
be translated into a derivation in the state-based logic of a translated, weaker Hoare triple.
Since we work with a constructive underlying logic, the range of program properties we can
reason about has a fine structure; in particular, we can distinguish between termination
and nondivergence, e.g., unbounded classically total search fails to be terminating, but is
nonetheless nondivergent. Our metatheory is entirely constructive as well, and we have
formalized it in Coq.
1. Introduction
Standard big-step semantics and Hoare logics do not support reasoning about nonterminat-
ing runs of programs. Essentially, they ignore them. But of course nonterminating runs are
important. Not only need we often program a partial function whose domain of defined-
ness we cannot decide or is undecidable, e.g., an interpreter, but we also have to program
functions that are inherently partial. In programming with interactive input/output, for
example, diverging runs are often what we really want.
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In search for a foundational framework for reasoning about possibly nonterminating
programs constructively (intuitionistically) and intrigued by attempts in this direction in
the literature, we have previously devised a big-step semantics for While based on traces
[17]. In this semantics, traces are possibly infinite sequences of states that a program run
goes through. They are defined coinductively, as is the evaluation relation, relating initial
states of program runs to traces they produce. On terminating runs, this nonstandard
semantics agrees with the standard, inductive state-based big-step semantics.
In this paper, we put forward a Hoare logic to match this big-step semantics. In this
new trace-based logic, program runs are reasoned about in terms of assertions on states and
traces. More precisely, our Hoare triple {U} s {P} is given by a statement s, a state assertion
U (a condition on the initial state of a run of s) and a trace assertion P (a condition on the
trace produced by the run). In the presentation we have chosen for this paper, assertions
are nothing but predicates expressible in the meta-logic, i.e., we do not confine ourselves
to a particular language of state and trace assertions. Nonetheless, we do not want to
downplay the question of what makes a good assertion language for traces. We are after
a set of connectives that allows for a concise formulation of a sound and complete Hoare
logic over state and trace predicates and logical entailment as given by the constructive
meta-logic. We adopt a solution that is reminiscent of interval temporal logic [14, 8], with a
chop-connective. This gives us a set of connectives that is Spartan in terms of convenience
of expression, but suffices for our meta-theoretical study. Our logic is intended foundational
framework into which more specialized and more applied logics with more limited assertion
languages can be embedded.
Besides being deterministic, the While language is also total as soon as we accept that
traces of program runs can be infinite. This allows our logic to conservatively extend both
the standard, state-based partial-correctness Hoare logic as well as the state-based total-
correctness Hoare logic. On the level of derivability alone this can be proved semantically by
going through the soundness and completeness results. But we go one step further: we show
that derivations in these two state-based logics are directly transformable into derivations
in our logic, yielding embeddings on the level of derivations, not just mere derivability. The
transformations are relatively straightforward and do not require invention of new invariants
or variants, demonstrating that our logic incurs no undue proof burden in comparison to
the standard Hoare logics. In the converse direction, we can project derivations in our trace-
based logic into derivations in the state-based logics: a derivation of a Hoare triple in the
trace-based logic is translated into a derivation in the state-based logics with a translated,
weaker postcondition.
However, the power of our logic goes beyond that of the state-based partial-correctness
and total-correctness Hoare logics. The assertions have access to traces. As suggested
by the similarity of our (open) assertion language to the that of interval temporal logic,
this allows us to specify liveness properties of diverging runs. We will demonstrate this
extra expressiveness of our logic by a series of examples. Also, interpreted into a construc-
tive underlying logic, our assertion language becomes quite discerning. In particular we
can distinguish between termination and nondivergence, e.g., unbounded classically total
(constructively nonpartial) search fails to be terminating, but is nonetheless nondivergent.
We do not discuss this in the paper, but our logic can be adjusted to deal with exceptions
and nondeterminism.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our trace-based big-step
semantics. In Section 3, we proceed to the question of a corresponding Hoare logic. We
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explain our design considerations and then present our Hoare logic and the soundness and
completeness proofs. In Section 4, we show the embeddings of the state-based partial-
correctness and total-correctness Hoare logics into our logic and the projections back. In
Section 5, we consider examples. In Section 6, we discuss the related work, to conclude in
Section 7.
We have formalized the development fully constructively in Coq version 8.1pl3 using
the Ssreflect syntax extension library. The Coq development is available at http://cs.io
c.ee/~keiko/code/abyss.tgz.
Both the paper and the accompanying Coq code use coinductive types, corecursion
and coinduction extensively. For an introduction, we can refer the reader to the exposition
of Bertot and Caste´ran [1, Ch. 13]. In the paper, we have sought to abstract over the
more bureaucratic aspects involved in the Coq formalization (e.g., working with Coq’s
restricted guardedness condition on cofix definitions, i.e., definitions by corecursion, proofs
by coinduction).
2. Big-step semantics
We start with our big-step semantics. This is defined in terms of states and traces. The
notion of a state is standard. A state σ ∈ state is an assignment of integer values to the
variables. Traces τ ∈ trace are defined coinductively by the rules1
〈σ〉 ∈ trace
τ ∈ trace
σ :: τ ∈ trace
so a trace is a non-empty colist (possibly infinite sequence) of states. We also define (strong)
bisimilarity of two traces, τ ≈ τ ′, coinductively by
〈σ〉 ≈ 〈σ〉
τ ≈ τ ′
σ :: τ ≈ σ :: τ ′
Bisimilarity is straightforwardly seen to be an equivalence. We think of bisimilar traces as
equal, i.e., type-theoretically we treat traces as a setoid with bisimilarity as the equivalence
relation.23 Accordingly, we have to make sure that all functions and predicates we define
on traces are setoid functions and predicates (i.e., insensitive to bisimilarity). We define
the initial state hd τ of a trace τ by case distinction by hd 〈σ〉 = σ, hd (σ :: τ) = σ. The
function hd is a setoid function. We also define finiteness of a trace (with a particular final
state) and infiniteness of a trace inductively resp. coinductively by
〈σ〉 ↓ σ
τ ↓ σ′
σ :: τ ↓ σ′
τ
(σ :: τ)
Finiteness and infiniteness are setoid predicates. It should be noticed that infiniteness is
defined positively, not as negation of finiteness. Constructively, it is not the case that
∀τ. (∃σ. τ ↓ σ) ∨ τ, which amounts to asserting that finiteness is decidable. In particular,
∀τ. (¬∃σ. τ ↓ σ)→ τ is constructively provable, but ∀τ.¬ τ → ∃σ. τ ↓ σ is not.
1We mark coinductive definitions by double horizontal rules.
2Classically, strong bisimilarity is equality. But we work in an intensional type theory where strong
bisimilarity of colists is weaker than equality (just as equality of two functions on all arguments is weaker
than equality of these two functions).
3In particular, we “pattern-match” traces using bisimilarity: any trace τ is bisimilar to either a trace of
the form of 〈σ〉 or one of the form σ :: τ ′.
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(x := e, σ)⇒ σ :: 〈σ[x 7→ JeKσ]〉 (skip, σ)⇒ 〈σ〉
(s0, σ)⇒ τ (s1, τ)
∗
⇒ τ ′
(s0; s1, σ)⇒ τ
′
σ |= e (st, σ :: 〈σ〉)
∗
⇒ τ
(if e then st else sf , σ)⇒ τ
σ 6|= e (sf , σ :: 〈σ〉)
∗
⇒ τ
(if e then st else sf , σ)⇒ τ
σ |= e (st, σ :: 〈σ〉)
∗
⇒ τ (while e do st, τ)
∗
⇒ τ ′
(while e do st, σ)⇒ τ
′
σ 6|= e
(while e do st, σ)⇒ σ :: 〈σ〉
(s, σ)⇒ τ
(s, 〈σ〉)
∗
⇒ τ
(s, τ)
∗
⇒ τ ′
(s, σ :: τ)
∗
⇒ σ :: τ ′
Figure 1: Big-step semantics
The statements of the While language are given by the following grammar where x
ranges over (integer) variables and e over (arithmetic) expressions built over variables.
s ::= x := e | skip | s0; s1 | if e then st else sf | while e do st
The integer value of an expression e in a state σ is denoted JeKσ. We also interpret expres-
sions as booleans; σ |= e stands for e being true in σ. Evaluation (s, σ) ⇒ τ , expressing
that running a statement s from a state σ produces a trace τ , is defined coinductively by
the rules in Figure 1. The rules for sequence and while implement the necessary sequencing
with the help of extended evaluation (s, τ)
∗
⇒ τ ′, also defined coinductively, as the coinduc-
tive prefix closure of evaluation: (s, τ)
∗
⇒ τ ′ expresses that running a statement s from the
last state (if it exists) of an already accumulated trace τ results in a total trace τ ′.
A remarkable feature of the definition of (s, τ)
∗
⇒ τ ′ is that it does not hinge on deciding
whether the trace τ is finite or not, which is constructively impossible. A proof of (s, τ)
∗
⇒ τ ′
simply traverses the already accumulated trace τ : if the last element is hit, which is the
case when τ is finite, then the statement is run, otherwise the traversal goes on forever.
We look closer at the sequence rule. We want to conclude that (s0; s1, σ)⇒ τ
′ from the
premise (s0, σ)⇒ τ . Classically, either the run of s0 terminates, i.e., τ ↓σ
′ for some σ′, or it
diverges, i.e., τ. In the first case, we would like to additionally use that τ is a finite prefix
of τ ′ and that (s1, σ
′)⇒ τ ′′, where τ ′′ is the rest of τ ′. In the second case, it should be case
that τ ≈ τ ′. In both cases, the desirable condition is equivalent to (s1, τ)
∗
⇒ τ ′, which is
the second premise of our rule. The use of extended evaluation, defined as the coinductive
(rather than inductive) prefix closure of evaluation, allows us to avoid the need to decide
whether the run of s0 terminates or not.
Evaluation is a setoid predicate.
Proposition 2.1 ([17]). For any s, σ, τ and τ ′, if (s, σ)⇒ τ and τ ≈ τ ′, then (s, σ)⇒ τ ′.
The trace produced from a state begins with this state.
Proposition 2.2. For any s, σ and τ , if (s, σ)⇒ τ , then hd τ = σ.
Moreover, for While, evaluation is deterministic (up to bisimilarity, as is appropriate
for our notion of trace equality).
Proposition 2.3 ([17]). For any s, σ, τ and τ ′, if (s, σ)⇒ τ and (s, σ)⇒ τ ′, then τ ≈ τ ′.
A HOARE LOGIC FOR THE COINDUCTIVE TRACE-BASED BIG-STEP SEMANTICS OF WHILE 5
And it is also total.
Proposition 2.4 ([17]). For any s and σ, there exists τ such that (s, σ)⇒ τ .
In our definition, we have made a choice as regards to what grows the trace of a run. We
have decided that assignments and testing of guards of if- and while-statements augment
the trace by a state (but skip does not), e.g., we have (x := 17, σ) ⇒ σ :: 〈σ[x 7→ 17]〉,
(while false do skip, σ)⇒ σ :: 〈σ〉 and (while true do skip, σ)⇒ σ :: σ :: σ :: . . ..
This is good for several reasons. First, skip becomes the unit of sequential composition,
i.e., the semantics does not distinguish s, skip; s and s; skip. Second, we get a notion of
small steps that fully agrees with a very natural coinductive trace-based small-step seman-
tics arising as a straightforward variation of the textbook inductive state-based small-step
semantics. The third and most important outcome is that any while-loop always progresses,
because testing of the guard is a small step. For instance, in our semantics while true do skip
can only derive (while true do skip, σ)⇒ σ :: σ :: σ :: . . . (up to bisimilarity). As we discuss
below, giving up insisting on progress in terms of growing the trace would introduce some
semantic anomalies. It also ensures that evaluation is total—as we should expect. Given
that it is also deterministic, we can thus equivalently turn our relational big-step semantics
into a functional one: the unique trace for a given statement and initial state is definable
by corecursion. (For details, see our previous paper [17].)
The coinductive trace-based semantics agrees with the inductive state-based semantics.
Proposition 2.5 ([17]). For any s, σ, σ′, existence of τ such that (s, σ)⇒ τ and τ ↓ σ′ is
equivalent to (s, σ)⇒ind σ′.
We notice that the inductive state-based semantics cannot be made total constructively.
It is unproblematic to complement the inductively defined terminating evaluation relation
with a coinductively defined diverging evaluation relation, but this does not help, as we
cannot decide the halting problem.
Discussions on alternative designs. We look at several seemingly not so different but prob-
lematic alternatives that we reject, thereby revealing some subtleties in designing coinduc-
tive big-step semantics and motivating our design choices.
Since progress of loops is not required for wellformedness of the definitions of ⇒ and
∗
⇒, one might be tempted to regard guard testing to be instantaneous and modify the rules
for the while-loop to take the form
σ |= e (st, σ)⇒ τ (while e do st, τ)
∗
⇒ τ ′
(while e do st, σ)⇒ τ
′
σ 6|= e
(while e do st, σ)⇒ 〈σ〉
This leads to undesirable outcomes. We can derive (while true do skip, σ) ⇒ 〈σ〉, which
means that the non-terminating while true do skip is considered semantically equivalent to
the terminal (immediately terminating) skip. Worse, we can also derive
(while true do skip;x := 17, σ) ⇒ σ :: 〈σ[x 7→ 17]〉, which is even more inadequate: a se-
quence can continue to run after the non-termination of the first statement. Yet worse,
inspecting the rules closer we discover we are also able to derive (while true do skip, σ)⇒ τ
for any τ . Mathematically, giving up insisting on progress in terms of growing the trace
has also the consequence that the relational semantics cannot be turned into a functional
one, although While should intuitively be total and deterministic. In a functional semantics,
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evaluation must be a trace-valued function and in a constructive setting such a function
must be productive.
Another option, where assignments and test of guards are properly taken to constitute
steps, could be to define
∗
⇒ by case distinction on the statement by rules such as
τ |=∗ e (st, duplast τ)
∗
⇒ τ ′ (while e do st, τ
′)
∗
⇒ τ ′′
(while e do st, τ)
∗
⇒ τ ′′
τ 6|=∗ e
(while e do st, τ)
∗
⇒ duplast τ
Here, duplast τ , defined corecursively, traverses τ and duplicates its last state, if it is finite.
Similarly, τ |=∗ e and τ 6|=∗ e traverse τ and evaluate e in the last state, if it is finite:
τ |=∗ e
σ :: τ |=∗ e
σ |= e
〈σ〉 |=∗ e
τ 6|=∗ e
σ :: τ 6|=∗ e
σ 6|= e
〈σ〉 6|=∗ e
(The rules for skip and sequence are very simple and appealing in this design.) The relation
⇒ would then be defined uniformly by the rule
(s, 〈σ〉)
∗
⇒ τ
(s, σ)⇒ τ
It turns out that we can still derive (while true do skip, σ) ⇒ τ for any τ . We can even
derive (while true do x := x+ 1, σ)⇒ τ for any τ .
The third alternative (Leroy and Grall use this technique in [12]) is most close to ours.
It introduces, instead of our
∗
⇒ relation, an auxiliary relation split , defined coinductively by
split 〈σ〉 〈σ〉 σ 〈σ〉
τ ≈ τ ′
split (σ :: τ) 〈σ〉 σ (σ :: τ ′)
split τ τ0 σ
′ τ1
split (σ :: τ) (σ :: τ0) σ
′ τ1
so that split τ ′ τ0 σ
′ τ1 expresses that the trace τ
′ can be split into a concatenation of
traces τ0 and τ1 glued together at a mid-state σ
′. Then the evaluation relation is defined
by replacing the uses of
∗
⇒ with split , e.g., the rule for the sequence statement would be:
split τ ′ τ0 σ
′ τ1 (s0, σ)⇒ τ0 (s1, σ
′)⇒ τ1
(s0; s1, σ)⇒ τ
′
This third alternative does not cause any outright anomalies for While. But alarmingly s1
has to be run from some (underdetermined) state within a run of s0; s1 even if the run of
s0 does not terminate. In a richer language with abnormal terminations, we get a serious
problem: no evaluation is derived for (while true do skip); abort although the abort statement
should not be reached.
3. Hoare logic
We now proceed to the Hoare logic and its soundness and completeness proof. We base
our consequence rule on semantic entailment rather than derivability in some fixed proof
system. This allows us to sidestep the problem of its unavoidable incompleteness due
to the impossibility of complete axiomatization of any theory containing arithmetic. By
identifying assertions with state and trace predicates (more precisely, predicates expressible
in the meta-logic), we also avoid the risk of possible incompleteness due to a chosen narrower
assertion language not being closed under weakest preconditions/strongest postconditions.
To formulate the rules of the Hoare logic, we introduce a small set of assertion connectives,
A HOARE LOGIC FOR THE COINDUCTIVE TRACE-BASED BIG-STEP SEMANTICS OF WHILE 7
σ |= true
¬(σ |= U)
σ |= ¬U
σ |= U σ |= V
σ |= U ∧ V . . .
τ |= true
¬(τ |= P )
τ |= ¬P
τ |= P τ |= Q
τ |= P ∧Q . . .
σ |= U
〈σ〉 |= 〈U〉
τ |= P τ ′ |=τ Q
τ ′ |= P ∗∗Q
τ |= 〈true〉
τ |= P †
τ |= P τ ′ |=τ P
†
τ ′ |= P †
σ |= U
σ :: (σ[x 7→ JeKσ]) |= U [x 7→ e]
σ |= U
σ :: 〈σ〉 |= 〈U〉2
τ |= P τ ↓ σ
σ |= Last P
τ ↓ σ
τ |= finite
τ
τ |= infinite
hd τ = σ τ |= Q
τ |=〈σ〉 Q
[flw-nil]
τ ′ |=τ Q
σ :: τ ′ |=σ::τ Q
[flw-delay]
∀σ. σ |= U → σ |= V
U |= V
∀τ. τ |= P → τ |= Q
P |= Q
Figure 2: Semantics of assertions
i.e., operations on predicates. To be able to express the strongest postcondition of any
precondition, we need a few additional connectives.
3.1. Assertions. Our assertions are predicates over states and traces. A state predicate U
is any predicate on states (in particular, it need not be decidable). From a trace predicate
P , we require additionally that it is a setoid predicate, i.e., it must be unable to distinguish
bisimilar traces.
Although we refrain from introducing a language of assertions, we introduce a number
of connectives for our assertions, which are operations on predicates. All trace predicate
connectives yield setoid predicates. The inference rules of the Hoare logic make use of these
connectives. Indeed, it was an intriguing exercise for us to come up with connectives that
would be small but expressive enough for practical specification purposes and at the same
time allow us to prove the Hoare logic sound and complete in our constructive setting.
The definitions of these connectives are given in Figure 2.4
The two most primitive state (resp. trace) predicates are true and false, which are respec-
tively true and false for any state (resp. trace). We can also use the standard connectives
¬,∧,∨ and quantifiers ∀,∃ to build state and trace predicates. The context disambiguates
the overloaded notations for these state and trace predicates.
4We use the symbol |= to highlight application of a predicate to a state or trace. We are not defining a
single satisfaction relation |= for some assertion language, but a number of individual state/trace predicates
and operations on such predicates. Some of these operations are defined inductively, some coinductively,
some definitions are not recursive at all.
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For a state predicate U , the singleton 〈U〉 is a trace predicate that is true of singleton
traces given by a state satisfying U . In particular 〈true〉 is true of any singleton trace.
For a state predicate U , the doubleton 〈U〉2 is true of a doubleton trace whose two
states are identical and satisfy U .
For a state predicate U , the update U [x 7→ e] is the strongest postcondition of the
statement x := e for the precondition U . It is true of a doubleton trace whose first state σ
satisfies U and second state is obtained from the first by modifying the value of x to become
JeK σ.
For trace predicates P and Q, the chop P ∗∗Q is a trace predicate that is true, roughly
speaking, of a trace τ ′ that has a prefix τ satisfying P , with the rest of τ ′ satisfying Q. (To
be more precise, the prefix and the rest overlap on a mid-state which is the last state of
the prefix and the first state of the suffix.) But its definition is carefully crafted, so that Q
is not checked, if τ is infinite (in which case necessarily τ ≈ τ ′), and this happens without
case distinction on whether τ is finite. This effect is achieved with the premise τ ′ |=τ Q.
The relation τ ′ |=τ Q is defined coinductively. It traverses all of τ , making sure that it is a
prefix of τ ′ (rule flw-delay), and, upon possible exhaustion of τ in a finite number of steps,
checks Q against the rest of τ ′ (rule flw-nil). This way the problem of deciding whether τ
is finite is avoided, basically by postponing it, possibly infinitely.
Our chop operator is classically equivalent to the chop operator from interval temporal
logic [14, 8] (cf. also the separating conjunction of separating logic). Indeed, classically,
τ ′ |= P ∗∗Q holds iff
• either, for some finite prefix τ of τ ′, we have τ |= P and τ ′′ |= Q, where τ ′′ is the rest of
τ ′,
• or τ ′ is infinite and τ ′ |= P .
This is how the semantics of chop is defined in interval temporal logic. But it involves an
upfront decision of whether P will be satisfied by a finite or an infinite prefix of τ ′. Our
definition is fine-tuned for constructive reasoning.
For a trace predicate P , its iteration P † is a trace predicate that is true of a trace which
is a concatenation of a possibly infinite sequence of traces, each of which satisfies P . (This is
modulo the overlap of the last and first states of consecutive traces in the sequence and the
empty concatenation being a singleton trace.) It is reminiscent of the Kleene star operator.
It is defined by coinduction and takes into account possibilities of both infiniteness of some
single iteration and infinite repetition.
For a trace predicate P , Last P is a state predicate that is true of states that can be
the last state of a finite trace satisfying P .
Trace predicates finite and infinite are true of finite and infinite traces, respectively.
For state predicates U and V (resp. trace predicates P and Q), U |= V (resp. P |= Q)
denotes entailment.
Proposition 3.1. For any U , 〈U〉, U [x 7→ e] and 〈U〉2 are setoid predicates. For any setoid
predicates P , Q, P ∗∗ Q is a setoid predicate. For any setoid predicate P , P † is a setoid
predicates. Moreover, finite and infinite are setoid predicates.
Proof. That 〈U〉, U [x 7→ e] and 〈U〉2 are setoid predicates follows from the definition. We
prove that P ∗∗Q and P † are setoid predicates when P and Q are by coinduction. That finite
and infinite are setoid predicates is proved by induction and by coinduction respectively.
Proposition 3.2. For any U and V , if U |= V , then 〈U〉 |= 〈V 〉, U [x 7→ e] |= V [x 7→ e]
and 〈U〉2 |= 〈V 〉2. For any setoid predicates P,P ′ and Q, if P |= P ′, then P ∗∗Q |= P ′ ∗∗Q
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and Q ∗∗ P |= Q ∗∗ P ′. For any setoid predicates P and Q, if P |= Q, then P † |= Q† and
Last P |= Last Q.
Proof. That 〈U〉, U [x 7→ e], 〈U〉2 are monotone follows from the definition. We prove that
P ∗∗Q and P † are monotone and that Last P is monotone by coinduction and by induction
respectively.
A number of logical consequences and equivalences hold about these connectives, to be
proved in Lemma 3.6. We have the trivial equivalence: 〈true〉 ∗∗P ⇔ P ⇔ P ∗∗ 〈true〉. The
chop operator is associative: (P ∗∗Q)∗∗R⇔ P ∗∗(Q∗∗R). The iterator operator P † repeats
P either zero times or once followed by further repetitions: P † ⇔ 〈true〉∨(P ∗∗P †). A trace
is infinite if and only if false holds for any last state: infinite ⇔ true∗∗ 〈false〉. If every trace
satisfying P is infinite, i.e., if P |= infinite, then any trace satisfying P has no last state,
i.e., Last P ⇔ false. We have P ∗∗ 〈Last P 〉 ⇔ P , so that if a trace satisfies P , then its last
state, if exists, satisfies Last P . The last state of a singleton trace 〈σ〉 is σ, therefore we
have Last 〈U〉 ⇔ U . We also have Last (P ∗∗Q) |= Last Q, but the converse does not hold.
E.g., Last true 6|= Last (false∗∗ true). Instead, we have Last (〈Last P 〉∗∗Q)⇔ Last (P ∗∗Q).
Finally we have Last (P ∗∗ 〈U〉)⇔ Last P ∧ U . Namely, a state satisfies U and can be the
last state of a finite trace satisfying P if and only if it can be the last state of a finite trace
satisfying P ∗∗ 〈U〉.
We define the concatenation of traces τ and τ ′, τ ++ τ ′, by replacing the last state of
τ by τ ′. Formally, it is defined by corecursion by
〈σ〉++ τ = τ (σ :: τ) ++ τ ′ = σ :: (τ ++ τ ′)
We first observe three results, which are useful for later proofs.
Lemma 3.3. For any τ , τ |=τ 〈true〉.
Proof. By coinduction and case analysis on τ . The case of τ ≈ 〈σ〉 follows from 〈σ〉 |= 〈true〉.
The case of τ ≈ σ :: τ ′: we get τ ′ |=τ ′ 〈true〉 from the coinduction hypothesis, from which
we obtain τ |=τ 〈true〉.
Lemma 3.4. For any U and τ, τ ′, if τ ′ |=τ 〈U〉, then τ ≈ τ
′.
Proof. By coinduction and inversion on τ ′ |=τ 〈U〉.
Lemma 3.5. For any U and τ , if for any σ, τ ↓ σ implies σ |= U , then τ |=τ 〈U〉.
Proof. By coinduction with case analysis on τ .
The case of τ ≈ 〈σ〉: We have τ ↓ σ, hence σ |= U by our hypothesis. We conclude
τ |=τ 〈U〉.
The case of τ ≈ σ′ :: τ ′: Since τ ′ ↓ σ implies τ ↓ σ, we have that, for any σ, τ ′ ↓ σ
implies σ |= U . We get τ ′ |=τ ′ 〈U〉 by the coinduction hypothesis, from where we conclude
τ |=τ 〈U〉.
Lemma 3.6. For any U, V and setoid predicates P,Q and R, we have
(1) 〈U〉 ∗∗ 〈V 〉2 ⇔ 〈U ∧ V 〉2 ⇔ 〈U〉2 ∗∗ 〈V 〉
(2) 〈U〉 ∗∗ 〈V 〉 ⇔ 〈U ∧ V 〉
(3) 〈true〉 ∗∗ P ⇔ P ⇔ P ∗∗ 〈true〉
(4) (P ∗∗Q) ∗∗R⇔ P ∗∗ (Q ∗∗R)
(5) P † ⇔ 〈true〉 ∨ (P ∗∗ P †)
(6) P † ⇔ P † ∗∗ P †
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(7) infinite ⇔ true ∗∗ 〈false〉
(8) If P |= infinite, then Last P ⇔ false.
(9) P ⇔ P ∗∗ 〈Last P 〉
(10) Last 〈U〉 ⇔ U
(11) Last (P ∗∗Q) |= Last Q
(12) Last (〈Last P 〉 ∗∗Q)⇔ Last (P ∗∗Q)
(13) Last (P ∗∗ 〈U〉) |= U
(14) Last (〈I〉 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)†) |= I
Proof.
(1) Follows from the definition.
(2) Follows from the definition.
(3) 〈true〉 ∗∗ P ⇔ P follows from the definition. P |= P ∗∗ 〈true〉 holds by Lemma 3.3.
Suppose τ ′ |= P ∗∗ 〈true〉. There exists τ such that τ |= P and τ ′ |=τ 〈true〉. By
Lemma 3.4 τ ≈ τ ′ holds, so we must have τ ′ |= P since P is a setoid predicate. This
proves P ∗∗ 〈true〉 |= P .
(4) Suppose τ ′′ |= (P ∗∗ Q) ∗∗ R. There exist τ and τ ′ such that τ |= P and τ ′ |=τ Q
and τ ′′ |=τ ′ R. We prove, for any τ0, τ1 and τ2, τ1 |=τ0 Q and τ2 |=τ1 R imply
τ2 |=τ0 Q ∗∗ R by coinduction and inversion on τ1 |=τ0 Q. This yields τ
′′ |=τ Q ∗∗ R
therefore τ ′′ |= P ∗∗ (Q ∗∗ R).
The converse is more subtle. Given τ ′′ |= P ∗∗ (Q ∗∗ R), we have to find a prefix
τ ′ of τ ′′ that satisfies P ∗∗ Q while τ ′′ |=τ ′ R. To do so, we define a function midp :
(τ1 |=τ0 P0 ∗∗Q0)→ trace by corecursion (we take τ0 and τ1 to be implicit parameters
of midp, inferred from the proof argument).5
midp (flw-nil σ τ0 ( : hd τ0 = σ) (h : τ0 |= P0 ∗∗Q0))
= let existT τ1 ( : τ1 |= P0 ∧ τ0 |=τ1 Q0) = h in τ1
midp (flw-delay σ τ0 τ1 (h : τ1 |=τ0 P0 ∗∗Q0)) = σ :: midp h
We then prove that, for any τ0, τ1 and h : τ1 |=τ0 P0 ∗∗ Q0, midp h |=τ0 P0 and
τ1 |=midp h Q0 hold by coinduction and inversion on h.
Now assume τ ′′ |= P ∗∗(Q∗∗R). There exists τ such that τ |= P and h : τ ′′ |=τ Q∗∗R.
We have midp h |= P ∗∗ Q, since midp h |=τ Q. This together with τ
′′ |=midp h R
proves τ ′′ |= (P ∗∗Q) ∗∗R, as required.
(5) Follows from the definition.
(6) Suppose τ |= P †. We have to prove τ |= P †∗∗P †. From Lemma 3.3 and (5), we deduce
τ |=τ P
†, which gives us τ |= P † ∗∗ P †. Conversely, suppose τ |= P † ∗∗ P †. There
exists τ ′ such that τ ′ |= P † and τ |=τ ′ P
†. We close the case by proving the following
two conditions by mutual coinduction6:
(a) ∀τ τ ′. τ |= P † → τ ′ |=τ P
† → τ ′ |= P †
(b) ∀τ τ ′ τ ′′. τ ′ |=τ P
† → τ ′′ |=τ ′ P
† → τ ′′ |=τ P
†.
(a): We perform inversion on τ |= P †. The case of τ |= 〈true〉, i.e., τ ≈ 〈σ〉: From
τ ′ |=τ P
†, we conclude τ ′ |= P †. The case of τ ′′ |= P and τ |=τ ′′ P
†: we get τ ′ |=τ ′′ P
†
by (b), from where we conclude τ ′ |= P †.
5Where useful, we give hypothetical proofs names, like h below; is for an anonymous dummy argument.
existT is the constructor of sigma-types in Coq.
6In Coq, we actually perform nested coinduction.
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(b): We perform inversion on τ ′ |=τ P
†. The case of τ ≈ 〈σ〉 and hd τ ′ = σ and
τ ′ |= P † follows from (a). The case of τ ≈ σ :: τ0 and τ
′ ≈ σ :: τ ′0 and τ
′
0 |=τ0 P
†:
We must have τ ′′ ≈ σ :: τ ′′0 and τ
′′
0 |=τ ′0 P
†. The coinduction hypothesis (b) gives us
τ0 |=τ ′′
0
P †, from which we conclude τ |=τ ′′ P
†.
(7) We prove an auxiliary condition: for any τ , infinite τ iff τ |=τ 〈false〉 by coinduction.
infinite |= true ∗∗ 〈false〉 follows from the condition. true ∗∗ 〈false〉 |= infinite follows
from the condition and Lemma 3.4.
(8) Follows from infinite ∧ finite |= false.
(9) Suppose τ |= P . By the definition of Last P , we have for any σ, τ↓σ implies σ |= Last P .
We then deduce τ |=τ 〈Last P 〉 by Lemma 3.5, thus conclude τ |= P ∗∗ 〈Last P 〉.
Conversely, suppose that τ ′ |= P ∗∗ 〈Last P 〉, i.e., τ |= P and τ ′ |=τ 〈Last P 〉 for
some τ . By Lemma 3.4, τ ≈ τ ′ holds, so we must have τ ′ |= P since P is a setoid
predicate.
(10) Follows from the definition.
(11) Suppose σ |= Last (P ∗∗ Q). There exist τ and τ ′ such that τ ′ ↓ σ and τ |= P and
τ ′ |=τ Q. We have to prove σ |= Last Q. We do so by proving an auxiliary condition:
for any σ0 and τ0, if τ0↓σ0, then for any τ1, τ0 |=τ1 Q implies σ0 |= Last Q by induction
on the derivation of τ0 ↓ σ0.
(12) Suppose σ |= Last (〈Last P 〉 ∗∗Q). There exist τ and τ ′ such that τ |= P , τ ↓ hd τ ′,
τ ′ |= Q and τ ′ ↓ σ. We then have that the concatenation of τ and τ ′ has the desired
properties. Namely, τ++τ ′ |= P ∗∗Q and (τ ++τ ′)↓σ. This proves σ |= Last (P ∗∗Q)
as we wanted.
Conversely, suppose σ |= Last (P ∗∗ Q). There exist τ and τ ′ such that τ |= P ,
τ ′ |=τ Q and τ
′ ↓ σ. The finiteness of τ ′ implies that of τ , i.e., we have τ ↓ σ′ for some
σ′. We can therefore find the suffix τ ′′ of τ ′ such that τ ′ ≈ τ ++ τ ′′ and hd τ ′′ = σ′.
(Basically, we drop the first n elements from τ ′ to obtain τ ′′, where n is the length of
τ . Since τ is finite, its length is defined.) Together τ ′ |=τ Q and τ ↓ σ
′ proves τ ′′ |= Q.
This concludes σ |= Last (〈Last P 〉 ∗∗Q), as we wanted.
(13) By the monotonicity of the last and chop operators, it suffices to prove Last (true ∗∗
〈U〉) |= U . Suppose σ |= Last (true ∗∗ 〈U〉). There exists τ such that τ ↓ σ and
τ |= true ∗∗ 〈U〉. We now prove ∀τ, σ. τ ↓σ → ∀τ ′. τ |=τ ′ 〈U〉 → σ |= U by induction on
the proof of τ ↓ σ, from where σ |= U follows.
(14) By (13) and the monotonicity of the chop and iterator operators, it suffices to prove
〈U〉 ∗∗ (true ∗∗ 〈U〉2)† |= true ∗∗ 〈U〉. Suppose τ |= 〈U〉 ∗∗ (true ∗∗ 〈U〉2)†. There exists
τ ′ such that τ ′ |= 〈U〉 and τ |=τ ′ (true ∗∗ 〈U〉
2)†, which give us τ |= (true ∗∗ 〈U〉2)† and
hd τ |= U . We want to prove τ |=τ 〈U〉. We do so by proving the following conditions
by mutual coinduction.
(a) ∀τ. hd τ |= U → τ |= (true ∗∗ 〈U〉2)† → τ |=τ 〈U〉
(b) ∀τ, τ ′, τ ′′. τ ′ |=τ 〈U〉
2 → τ ′′ |=τ ′ (true ∗∗ 〈U〉
2)† → τ ′′ |=τ ′′ 〈U〉.
(a): We perform inversion on τ |= (true ∗∗ 〈U〉2)†. The case of τ |= 〈true〉: We have
τ ≈ 〈σ〉. This and hd τ |= U prove τ |=τ 〈U〉. The case of τ
′ |= true ∗∗ 〈U〉2 and
τ |=τ ′ (true ∗∗ 〈U〉
2)†: The former gives us τ ′ |=τ ′′ 〈U〉
2 for some τ ′′. We therefore
conclude τ |=τ 〈U〉 by (b).
(b): We perform inversion on τ ′ |=τ 〈U〉
2: The case of τ ≈ 〈σ〉 and hd τ ′ = σ and
τ ′ |= 〈U〉2: We have τ ′ ≈ σ :: 〈σ〉, therefore τ ′′ ≈ σ :: τ ′′0 for some τ
′′
0 with hd τ
′′
0 = σ,
and τ ′′0 |= (true ∗∗ 〈U〉
2)†. From (a), we obtain τ ′′0 |=τ ′′0 〈U〉, which yields τ
′′ |=τ ′′ 〈U〉,
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as required. The case of τ ′ ≈ σ :: τ ′0 and τ ≈ σ :: τ0 and τ
′
0 |=τ0 〈U〉
2: We have
τ ′′ ≈ σ :: τ ′′0 and τ
′′
0 |=τ ′0 (true ∗∗ 〈U〉
2)†. By (b), we get τ ′′0 |=τ ′′0 〈U〉, which yields
τ ′′ |=τ ′′ 〈U〉.
3.2. Inference rules. The derivable judgements of the Hoare logic are given by the induc-
tively interpreted inference rules in Figure 3. The proposition {U} s {P} states derivability
of the judgement. The intent is that {U} s {P} should be derivable precisely when running
a statement s from an initial state satisfying U is guaranteed to produce a trace satisfying
P .
The rules for assignment and skip are self-explanatory.
The rule for sequence is defined in terms of the chop operator. The precondition V for
the second statement s1 is given by those states in which a run of the first statement s0 may
terminate. In particular, if {U} s0 {P} and P |= infinite, i.e., s0 is necessarily diverging for
the precondition U , then we have {U} s0 {P ∗∗ 〈false〉}. In this case, from the derivability
of {false} s1 {Q} for any Q, we get {U} s0; s1 {P ∗∗ Q} for any Q. But this makes sense,
since P ∗∗Q⇔ P as soon as P |= infinite.
The rule for if-statement uses the doubleton operator in accordance with the operational
semantics where we have chosen that testing the boolean guard grows the trace.
The rule for while-statement is inspired by the corresponding rule of the standard, state-
based partial-correctness Hoare logic. It uses a loop invariant I. This is a state predicate
that has to be true each time the boolean guard is about to be (re-)tested in a run of the
loop. Accordingly, the precondition U should be stronger then I. Also, I must hold each
time an iteration of st has finished, as enforced by having P ∗∗ 〈I〉 as the postcondition of
st. The postcondition 〈U〉
2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉 of the loop consists of three parts. 〈U〉2
accounts for the first test of the guard; (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† accounts for iterations of the loop body
in alternation with re-tests of the guard (notice that that we are again using the doubleton
operator); 〈¬e〉 accounts for the state in which the last test of the guard is finished.
We have chosen to introduce a separate rule for instantiating auxiliary variables. Alter-
natively, we might have stated the consequence rule in a more general form, as suggested
by Kleymann [13]; yet the separation facilitates formalization in Coq.
The various logical consequences and equivalences about the connectives suggest also
further alternative and equivalent formulations. For instance, we could replace the rule for
the while-statement by
{e ∧ I} st {P ∗∗ 〈I〉}
{I} while e do st {〈I〉
2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉}
if we strengthened the consequence rule to
U |= U ′ {U ′} s {P ′} 〈U〉 ∗∗ P ′ |= P
{U} s {P}
With our chosen rule for while, this strengthened version of consequence is admissible:
Lemma 3.7. For any U , s and P , if {U} s {P}, then {U} s {〈U〉 ∗∗ P}.
Proof. We prove the following more general statement by induction on the derivation of
{U} s {P}: for any U , s and P , if {U} s {P}, then for any V , {U ∧ V } s {〈V 〉 ∗∗ P}.
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{U} x := e {U [x 7→ e]} {U} skip {〈U〉}
{U} s0 {P ∗∗ 〈V 〉} {V } s1 {Q}
{U} s0; s1 {P ∗∗Q}
{e ∧ U} st {P} {¬e ∧ U} sf {P}
{U} if e then st else sf {〈U〉
2 ∗∗ P}
U |= I {e ∧ I} st {P ∗∗ 〈I〉}
{U} while e do st {〈U〉
2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉}
U |= U ′ {U ′} s {P ′} P ′ |= P
{U} s {P}
∀z. {U} s {P}
{∃z. U} s {∃z. P}
Figure 3: Inference rules of Hoare logic
We do not attempt to argue that our formulation is the best choice; yet we found
that the present formulation is viable from the points-of-view of both the meta-theory and
applicability of the logic.
3.3. Soundness. The soundness result states that any derivable Hoare triple is semantically
valid in the sense that, if the precondition holds of the initial state of an evaluation, then
the postcondition is true of the trace produced.
Proposition 3.8 (Soundness). For any s, U and P , if {U} s {P}, then, for all σ and τ ,
σ |= U and (s, σ)⇒ τ imply τ |= P .
Proof. By induction on the derivation of {U} s {P}. We show the main cases of sequence
and while.
• s = s0; s1: We are given as the induction hypothesis that, for any σ, τ , (s0, σ) ⇒ τ and
σ |= U imply τ |= P ∗∗ 〈V 〉, and that, for any σ, τ , (s1, σ) ⇒ τ and σ |= V imply τ |= Q.
We have to prove τ1 |= P ∗∗ Q, given σ |= U and (s0, σ) ⇒ τ0 and (s1, τ0)
∗
⇒ τ1. The
induction hypothesis for s0 gives us τ0 |= P ∗∗ 〈V 〉. By Lemma 3.4 and that P is a setoid
predicate, we derive h0 : τ0 |= P and τ0 |=τ0 〈V 〉. We prove by coinduction an auxiliary
lemma: for any τ , τ ′, τ |=τ 〈V 〉 and (s1, τ)
∗
⇒ τ ′ give τ ′ |=τ Q, using the induction
hypothesis for s1. The lemma gives us h1 : τ1 |=τ0 Q. We can now close the case by h0
and h1.
• s = while e do st: We are given as the induction hypothesis that for any σ and τ , σ |=
e ∧ I and (σ, st) ⇒ τ imply τ |= P ∗∗ 〈I〉. We also have U |= I . We have to prove
τ |= 〈U〉2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉, given σ |= U and (while e do st, σ)⇒ τ . We prove that,
for any σ and τ , (while e do st, σ) ⇒ τ implies τ |=τ 〈¬e〉 by coinduction. It remains
to prove τ |= 〈U〉2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)†. By inversion on (while e do st, σ) ⇒ τ , we learn that
τ ≈ σ′ :: τ ′ for some σ′ and τ ′ such that hd τ ′ = σ′. So, we close the case by proving the
following conditions by mutual coinduction:
– for any σ and τ , if σ |= I and (while e do st, σ)⇒ σ :: τ , then τ |= (P ∗∗ 〈I〉
2)†
– for any τ and τ ′, if τ |=τ 〈I〉 and (while e do st, τ)
∗
⇒ τ ′, then τ ′ |=τ 〈I〉
2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)†.
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sp(x := e, U) = U [x 7→ e]
sp(skip, U) = 〈U〉
sp(s0; s1, U) = P ∗∗ sp(s1,Last P ) where P = sp(s0, U)
sp(if e then st else sf , U) = 〈U〉
2 ∗∗ (sp(st, e ∧ U) ∨ sp(sf ,¬e ∧ U))
sp(while e do st, U) = 〈U〉
2 ∗∗ (sp(st, e ∧ I) ∗∗ 〈I〉
2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉
where I = Inv(e, st, U)
σ |= U
σ |= Inv(e, s, U)
V |= Inv(e, s, U) σ |= Last (〈Inv (e, s, U) ∧ e〉 ∗∗ sp(s, V ))
σ |= Inv(e, s, U)
Figure 4: Strongest postcondition
Thanks to Proposition 2.4 (totality of evaluation), as an immediate corollary of Propo-
sition 3.8 (soundness) we learn that, if a state satisfies the precondition of a derivable Hoare
triple, then there exists an evaluation producing a trace satisfying the postcondition.
Corollary 3.9 (Total-correctness soundness). For any s, U and P , if {U} s {P}, then, for
any σ such that σ |= U , there exists τ such that (s, σ)⇒ τ and τ |= P .
3.4. Completeness. The completeness result states that any semantically valid Hoare
triple is derivable. Following the standard approach (see, e.g., [20]) we define, for a given
statement s and a given precondition U , a trace predicate sp(s, U)—the candidate strongest
postcondition. Then we prove that sp(s, U) is a postcondition according to the logic (i.e.,
{U} s {sp(s, U)} is derivable) and that sp(s, U) is semantically stronger than any other
trace predicate that is a postcondition semantically. Completeness follows.
The trace predicate sp(s, U) is defined by recursion on s in Figure 4. The definition is
mostly self-explanatory, as it mimics the inference rules of the logic, except that we need
the loop-invariant Inv(e, s, U). Inv(e, s, U) characterizes the set of states that are reachable
by some run of while e do st from a state satisfying U and where the boolean guard is tested
in that run.7
For any s and U , the predicate sp(s, U) is a monotone setoid predicate.
Lemma 3.10. For any s, U , τ , τ ′, if τ |= sp(s, U) and τ ≈ τ ′, then τ ′ |= sp(s, U).
Proof. By induction on the structure of s.
Lemma 3.11. For any s, U , U ′, if U |= U ′, then sp(s, U) |= sp(s, U ′).
Proof. By induction on the structure of s.
The following lemma states that any trace which satisfies sp(s, U) has its first state
satisfying U .
Lemma 3.12. For any s, U , τ , if τ |= sp(s, U), then hd τ |= U .
Proof. By induction on the structure of s.
7Because of the induction-recursion involved in the simultaneous definition of Inv(e, s, U) and sp(s, U),
we have used impredicativity in our Coq development.
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The next lemma states a crucial property of Inv(e, s, U).
Lemma 3.13. For any s, e, U , sp(s, Inv(e, s, U)∧e) ⇔ sp(s, Inv(e, s, U)∧e)∗∗〈Inv(e, s, U)〉.
Proof. (⇒): Suppose τ |= sp(s, Inv(e, s, U)∧e). It suffices to prove τ |=τ 〈Inv(e, s, U)〉. We
have hd τ |= Inv(e, s, U) ∧ e by Lemma 3.12, and τ |= sp(s, Inv(e, s, U)) by Lemma 3.11
and Inv(e, s, U)∧ e |= Inv(e, s, U). These give us τ |= 〈Inv(e, s, U)∧ e〉 ∗∗ sp(s, Inv (e, s, U)).
By the definition of Inv, we have for any σ, τ ↓ σ implies σ |= Inv(e, s, U). Therefore we
conclude τ |=τ 〈Inv(e, s, U)〉 by Lemma 3.5.
(⇐): Suppose τ |= sp(s, Inv(e, s, U) ∧ e) ∗∗ 〈Inv(e, s, U)〉. We then have some τ ′ such
that τ ′ |= sp(s, Inv(e, s, U) ∧ e) and τ |=τ ′ 〈Inv(e, s, U)〉. The latter proves τ ≈ τ
′ by
Lemma 3.4. We conclude τ |= sp(s, Inv(e, s, U) ∧ e) by Lemma 3.10.
We are now ready to establish that sp(s, U) is a postcondition according to the Hoare
logic.
Lemma 3.14. For any s, U , we have {U} s {sp(s, U)}.
Proof. By induction on s. We show the main cases of sequence and while.
• s = s0; s1: We are given as the induction hypotheses that, for any U0,
{U0} s0 {sp(s0, U0)} and {U0} s1 {sp(s1, U0)}. We have to prove {U} s0; s1 {P ∗∗
sp(s1,Last P )} where P = sp(s0, U). By the induction hypothesis, we have {U} s0 {P},
thus {U} s0 {P ∗∗〈Last P 〉} by (9) of Lemma 3.6 and the consequence rule. We therefore
close the case with {Last P} s1 {sp(s1,Last P )} given by the induction hypothesis.
• s = while e do st: We are given as the induction hypothesis that {U0} st {sp(st, U0)}, for
any U0. We have to prove {U} while e do st {〈U〉
2 ∗∗ (sp(st, e∧ I)∗∗ 〈I〉
2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉} where
I = Inv(e, st, U). It is sufficient to prove {e ∧ I} st {(sp(st, e ∧ I) ∗∗ 〈I〉)}, which follows
from the induction hypothesis and Lemma 3.13.
Following the standard route, it remains to prove the following condition: for any s, U , P ,
if for all σ, τ , σ |= U and (s, σ)⇒ τ imply τ |= P , then sp(s, U) |= P .
This will be an immediate corollary from Lemma 3.12 and the following lemma, stating
that any trace satisfying sp(s, U) is in fact produced by a run of s.
Lemma 3.15. For any s, U , τ , if τ |= sp(s, U) then (s, hd τ)⇒ τ .
Proof. By induction on s. We show the main cases of sequence and while.
• s = s0; s1: We are given as the induction hypotheses that, for any U
′, τ ′, τ ′ |= sp(s0, U
′)
(resp. τ ′ |= sp(s1, U
′)) implies (s0, hd τ
′) ⇒ τ ′ (resp. (s1, hd τ
′) ⇒ τ ′). We have to
prove (s0; s1, hd τ) ⇒ τ , given τ |= sp(s0; s1, U), which unfolds into τ0 |= sp(s0, U) and
τ |=τ0 sp(s1,Last (sp(s0, U))). By the induction hypothesis for s0, we have (s0, hd τ0)⇒
τ0. Using the induction hypothesis for s1, we prove by coinduction that, for any τ1, τ2,
τ2 |=τ1 sp(s1,Last (sp(s0, U))) implies (s1, τ1)
∗
⇒ τ2, thereby we close the case.
• s = while e do st: We are given as the induction hypothesis that, for any U
′, τ ′, τ ′ |=
sp(st, U
′) implies (st, hd τ
′) ⇒ τ ′. We have to prove (while e do st, hd τ) ⇒ τ , given
τ |= 〈U〉2 ∗∗ (sp(st, e ∧ I) ∗∗ 〈I〉
2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉 where I = Inv(e, st, U). We do so by proving
the following two conditions simultaneously by mutual coinduction:
– for any τ , τ |= (sp(st, e ∧ I) ∗∗ 〈I〉
2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉 implies (while e do st, hd τ)⇒ hd τ :: τ ,
– for any τ and τ ′, τ ′ |=τ 〈I〉
2 ∗∗ (sp(st, e ∧ I) ∗∗ 〈I〉
2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉 implies
(while e do st, τ)
∗
⇒ τ ′.
16 K. NAKATA AND T. UUSTALU
Corollary 3.16. For any s, U and P , if for all σ and τ , σ |= U and (s, σ) ⇒ τ imply
τ |= P , then sp(s, U) |= P .
Completeness is proved as a corollary of Lemma 3.14 and Corollary 3.16.
Proposition 3.17 (Completeness). For any s, U and P , if for all σ and τ , σ |= U and
(s, σ)⇒ τ imply τ |= P , then {U} s {P}.
Proof. Assume that for all σ, τ , σ |= U and (s, σ)⇒ τ imply τ |= P . By Corollary 3.16, we
have that sp(s, U) |= P . By Lemma 3.14, we have {U} s {sp(s, U)}. Applying consequence,
we get {U} s {P}.
Combining Propositions 2.3 (determinacy of evaluation) and 3.17 (completeness), we
immediately get completeness for total correctness.
Corollary 3.18 (Total-correctness completeness). For any s, U and P , if, for all σ such
that σ |= U , there is τ such that (s, σ)⇒ τ and τ |= P , then {U} s {P}.
4. Relation to the standard partial-correctness and total-correctness
Hoare logics
It is easy to see, by going through the soundness and completeness results, that our trace-
based Hoare logic is a conservative extension of the standard, state-based partial-correctness
and total-correctness Hoare logics. But more can be said. The derivations in these two logics
are directly transformable into derivations in our logic, preserving their structure, without
invention of new invariants or variants. And in the converse direction, derivations in our
logic are transformable into derivations into the standard logics in a way that removes from
postconditions information about intermediate states. In this direction, the variant for a
while-loop is obtained by bounding the length of traces satisfying the trace invariant of the
loop.
Concerning total correctness, we use two variations of the while-rule. In the forward
transformation, we use a version of the while-rule with a dedicated variant (a natural-valued
function on states) whereas, in the backward transformation, we work with a version where
the invariant (a state predicate) is made dependent on a natural number (i.e., becomes a
relation between states and naturals; crucially, there is no functionality requirement: in
the same state, the invariant can be satisfied by zero or one or several naturals). The two
alternative while-rules for total correctness are:
∀n : nat . {e ∧ I ∧ t = n} st {I ∧ t < n}
{I ∧ t = m} while e do st {I ∧ t ≤ m ∧ ¬e}
while-fun
and
∀n : nat . {e ∧ J n} st {∃k. k < n ∧ J k}
{J m} while e do st {∃k. k ≤ m ∧ J k ∧ ¬e}
while-rel
There is a reason for this discrepancy, which reflects our compromise between pursuing a
constructive approach and striving for purely syntactic translations. We will discuss it in
Section 4.3 after having presented the transformations.
We have tried to fine-tune the inference rules in the different Hoare logics and the
transformations between them for smoothness. There is some room for variations in them.
The transformations are quite sensitive to the exact division of labor in the source and
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target Hoare logics between the rules for the statement constructors and the consequence
rule, but the effects of the possible variations are mostly inessential.
For reference, the inference rules of the state-based logics appear in the Appendix.
Notice that also here we use predicates as assertions and entailment as consequence, so
there is no dedicated assertion language or proof system for assertions.
4.1. Embeddings of the standard Hoare logics into the trace-based logic. We
formalize our claim of embeddability of the standard Hoare logics in the following two
propositions, whose direct proofs are algorithms for the transformations.
Proposition 4.1 states that, if {U} s {Z} is a derivable partial-correctness judgement,
then {U} s {true ∗∗ 〈Z〉} is derivable in our logic. The trace predicate true ∗∗ 〈Z〉 indicates
that Z holds of any state that is reachable by traversing, in a finite number of steps, the
whole trace τ produced by running s. Classically, this amounts to Z being true of the last
state of τ , if τ is finite and hence has one; if τ is infinite, then nothing is required.
Proposition 4.2 states that, if {U} s {Z} is a derivable total-correctness judgement,
then {U} s {finite ∗∗ 〈Z〉} is derivable in our logic (in fact, it states a little more). The
trace predicate finite ∗∗ 〈Z〉 expresses that the trace τ produced by running s is finite and
Z holds of the last state of τ ; the finiteness of τ guarantees the existence of this last state.
Proposition 4.1. For any s, U and Z, if {U} s {Z} is derivable in the partial-correctness
Hoare logic, then {U} s {true ∗∗ 〈Z〉} is derivable in the trace-based Hoare logic.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of {U} s {Z}. We show the main cases of sequence
and while.
• s = s0; s1: We are given as the induction hypotheses {U} s0 {true∗∗〈V 〉} and {V } s1 {true∗∗
〈Z〉}. We have to prove {U} s0; s1 {true ∗∗ 〈Z〉}, which is derived by
.... IH0
{U} s0 {true ∗∗ 〈V 〉}
.... IH1
{V } s1 {true ∗∗ 〈Z〉}
{U} s0; s1 {true ∗∗ true ∗∗ 〈Z〉}
{U} s0; s1 {true ∗∗ 〈Z〉}
(1)
(1) We have
true ∗∗ true ⇔ true
• s = while e do st: We are given as the induction hypothesis {e ∧ I} st {true ∗∗ 〈I〉}. We
have to prove {I} while e do st {true ∗∗ 〈I ∧ ¬e〉}, which is derived by
.... IHt
{e ∧ I} st {true ∗∗ 〈I〉}
{I} while e do st {〈I〉
2 ∗∗ (true ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉}
{I} while e do st {true ∗∗ 〈I ∧ ¬e〉}
(1)
(1) We have
〈I〉2 ∗∗ (true ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉
|= true ∗∗ 〈I〉 ∗∗ 〈¬e〉
⇔ true ∗∗ 〈I ∧ ¬e〉 (by Lemma 3.6 (2))
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For the embedding of total-correctness derivations, we prove a slightly stronger statement
to have the induction go through.
Proposition 4.2. For any s, U and Z, if {U} s {Z} is derivable in the total-correctness
Hoare logic with while-fun, then for any W , {U ∧W} s {〈W 〉 ∗∗ finite ∗∗ 〈Z〉} is derivable
in the trace-based Hoare logic.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of {U} s {Z}. We show the main cases of sequence
and while.
• s = s0; s1: We are given as the induction hypotheses that, for anyW0, {U∧W0} s0 {〈W0〉∗∗
finite ∗∗ 〈V 〉} and, for any W1, {V ∧W1} s1 {〈W1〉 ∗∗ finite ∗∗ 〈Z〉}. We have to prove
that, for any W , {U ∧W} s0; s1 {〈W 〉 ∗∗ finite ∗∗ 〈Z〉}. This is done by the derivation
.... IH0W
{U ∧W} s0 {〈W 〉 ∗∗ finite ∗∗ 〈V 〉}
.... IH1 V
{V ∧ V } s1 {〈V 〉 ∗∗ finite ∗∗ 〈Z〉}
{V } s1 {〈V 〉 ∗∗ finite ∗∗ 〈Z〉}
{U ∧W} s0; s1 {〈W 〉 ∗∗ finite ∗∗ 〈V 〉 ∗∗ finite ∗∗ 〈Z〉}
{U ∧W} s0; s1 {〈W 〉 ∗∗ finite ∗∗ 〈Z〉}
(1)
(1) We have
finite ∗∗ 〈V 〉 ∗∗ finite |= finite ∗∗ finite ⇔ finite
• s = while e do st: We are given as the induction hypothesis that, for all n : nat and Wt,
{e ∧ I ∧ t = n ∧Wt} st {〈Wt〉 ∗∗ finite ∗∗ 〈I ∧ t < n〉}. We have to prove that, for any W ,
{I ∧ t = m ∧W} while e do st {〈W 〉 ∗∗ finite ∗∗ 〈I ∧ ¬e ∧ t ≤ m〉}. This is accomplished
by the derivation
.... ∀n. IHt n (t = n ∧ t ≤ m)
∀n. {e ∧ I ∧ t = n ∧ t = n ∧ t ≤ m} st {〈t = n ∧ t ≤ m〉 ∗∗ finite ∗∗ 〈I ∧ t < n〉}
∀n. {e ∧ I ∧ t = n ∧ t ≤ m} st {〈t = n〉 ∗∗ finite ∗∗ 〈I ∧ t < n ∧ t ≤ m〉}
(2)
{∃n. e ∧ I ∧ t = n ∧ t ≤ m} st {∃n. 〈t = n〉 ∗∗ finite ∗∗ 〈I ∧ t < n ∧ t ≤ m〉}
{e ∧ I ∧ t ≤ m} st {(∃n.〈t = n〉 ∗∗ finite ∗∗ 〈t < n〉) ∗∗ 〈I ∧ t ≤ m〉}
{I ∧ t = m ∧W} while e do st
{〈I ∧ t = m ∧W 〉2 ∗∗ ((∃n.〈t = n〉 ∗∗ finite ∗∗ 〈t < n〉) ∗∗ 〈I ∧ t ≤ m〉2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉}
{I ∧ t = m ∧W} while e do st {〈W 〉 ∗∗ finite ∗∗ 〈I ∧ ¬e ∧ t ≤ m〉}
(1)
(1) The repetition gives rise to a non-empty colist of values of t, which is strictly decreas-
ing and must hence be of finite length. The concatenation of a finite colist of finite
traces is finite.
(2) If t = n and t ≤ m in the first state of a trace, then n ≤ m (everywhere), so in the
last state t < n gives t < m, which can be weakened to t ≤ m.
Corollary 4.3. For any s, U and Z, if {U} s {Z} is derivable in the total-correctness
Hoare logic with while-fun, then {U} s {finite ∗∗ 〈Z〉} is derivable in the trace-based Hoare
logic.
Proof. Immediate from Proposition 4.2 by choosing W = true.
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4.2. Projections of the trace-based logic into standard Hoare logics. Given that
derivations in the standard Hoare logics can be transformed into derivations in the trace-
based Hoare logic, it is natural to wonder, if it is also possible to translate derivations
in the converse direction. In this direction we would expect some loss (or displacement)
of information. Reducing a condition on traces into a condition on those last states that
happen to exist or into a condition that also requires their existence must lose or displace
the constraints on the intermediate states.
We now proceed to demonstrating that meaningful transformations (“projections”)
from the trace-based logic to the standard logics are indeed possible.
We will show that, if {U} s {P} is derivable in the trace-based Hoare logic, then so
are {U} s {Last P} in the partial-correctness Hoare logic and {U ∧ ⌈P ⌉m} s {Last P}
in the total-correctness Hoare logic. We will shortly define ⌈P ⌉m formally, but intuitively,
the total-correctness judgement states that s terminates in a state satisfying Last P from
any initial state σ such that U holds in σ and any σ-headed trace satisfying P has length
at most m. Since m is universally quantified on the top level, we can actually derive
{U ∧ ∃m. ⌈P ⌉m} s {Last P}, stating that s terminates in a state satisfying Last P from
any initial state σ such that U holds and the length of σ-headed traces satisfying P is
bounded.
Proposition 4.4. For any s, U and P , if {U} s {P} in the trace-based Hoare logic, then
for any W , {U ∧W} s {Last (〈W 〉 ∗∗P )} is derivable in the partial-correctness Hoare logic.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of {U} s {P}. We show the main cases of sequence
and while.
• s = s0; s1: We are given as the induction hypotheses that {U ∧W0} s0 {Last (〈W0〉∗∗P ∗∗
〈V 〉)}, for any W0, and {V ∧W1} s1 {Last (〈W1〉 ∗∗Q)}, for any W1. We have to show
that, for any W , {U ∧W} s0; s1 {Last (〈W 〉∗∗P ∗∗Q)}. Let V
′ = Last (〈W 〉∗∗P ∗∗ 〈V 〉).
We have the derivation
.... IH0W
{U ∧W} s0 {V
′}
.... IH1 V
′
{V ∧ V ′} s1 {Last (〈V
′〉 ∗∗Q)}
{V ′} s1 {Last (〈V
′〉 ∗∗Q)}
(2)
{U ∧W} s0; s1 {Last (〈V
′〉 ∗∗Q)}
{U ∧W} s0; s1 {Last (〈W 〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗Q)}
(1)
(1) Recalling that Last is monotone, we have
Last (〈V ′〉 ∗∗Q)
= Last (〈Last (〈W 〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈V 〉)〉 ∗∗Q)
⇔ Last (〈W 〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈V 〉 ∗∗Q) (by Lemma 3.6 (12))
|= Last (〈W 〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗Q)
(2) By Lemma 3.6 (10) and (11), V ′ = Last (〈W 〉∗∗P ∗∗〈V 〉) |= V , therefore V ′ |= V ∧V ′.
• s = while e do st: We are given as the induction hypothesis that, for any Wt,
{I ∧ e ∧ Wt} st {Last (〈Wt〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈I〉)}. We now have to prove that, for any W ,
{U ∧W} while e do st {Last (〈W 〉 ∗∗ 〈U〉
2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉)}, given U |= I. Let
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I ′ = Last (〈W 〉 ∗∗ 〈U〉2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)†). We close the case by the derivation
.... IHt I
′
{e ∧ I ∧ I ′} st {Last (〈I
′〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈I〉)}
{e ∧ I ′} st {I
′}
(2)
{I ′} while e do st {I
′ ∧ ¬e}
{U ∧W} while e do st {Last (〈W 〉 ∗∗ 〈U〉
2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉)}
(1)
(1) We have
U ∧W
⇔ Last (〈W 〉 ∗∗ 〈U〉2 ∗∗ 〈true〉) (by Lemma 3.6 (1) and (10))
|= Last (〈W 〉 ∗∗ 〈U〉2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)†) (by Lemma 3.6 (5))
= I ′
(2) We have
Last (〈I ′〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈I〉)
= Last (〈Last (〈W 〉 ∗∗ 〈U〉2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)†)〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈I〉)
⇔ Last (〈W 〉 ∗∗ 〈U〉2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈I〉) (by Lemma 3.6 (12))
⇔ Last (〈W 〉 ∗∗ 〈U〉2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)
|= Last (〈W 〉 ∗∗ 〈U〉2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)†)
= I ′
Corollary 4.5. For any s, U and P , if {U} s {P}, then {U} s {Last P} is derivable in
the partial correctness Hoare logic.
Proof. Immediate from Proposition 4.4 and Lemma 3.6 (3) by instantiating W = true.
To define the assertion translation for the projection of the trace-based Hoare logic
into the total-correctness Hoare logic, we introduce two new connectives. The inductively
defined trace predicate len n is true of finite traces with length at most n (we take the
singleton trace to have length 0). Given a trace predicate P , the state predicate ⌈P ⌉n is
defined to be true of a state σ, if every trace headed by σ and satisfying P also satisfies
len n.
〈σ〉 |= len n
τ |= len n
σ :: τ |= len (n+ 1)
∀τ. hd τ = σ ∧ τ |= P → τ |= len n
σ |= ⌈P ⌉n
Lemma 4.6. For any n, P and Q, if Q |= P then ⌈P ⌉n |= ⌈Q⌉n.
For setoid predicates P and Q, we say Q extends P , written P ⊳Q, if, whenever τ |= P ,
there exists τ ′ such that τ ′ |=τ Q, i.e., ∀τ. τ |= P → ∃τ
′. τ ′ |=τ Q.
Lemma 4.7. For any P,P ′, Q and Q′, if P ′ |= P and Q |= Q′ then P ⊳ Q→ P ′ ⊳ Q′.
Proof. Follows from the definition.
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Lemma 4.8. For any P,Q and R, (P ∗∗Q) ⊳ R→ (〈Last P 〉 ∗∗Q) ⊳ R.
Proof. Suppose τ0 |= 〈Last P 〉 ∗∗ Q. There exists τ1 such that τ1 |= P and τ1 ↓ hd τ0.
We then have τ1 ++ τ0 |= P ∗∗ Q. The hypothesis gives us that there exists τ2 such that
τ2 |=τ1++τ0 Q. We then build a trace τ3 such that τ3 |=τ0 Q from τ2 by dropping the first n
elements, where n is the length of τ1. (n is welldefined because τ1 is finite.)
Lemma 4.9. For any P and Q, 〈Last P 〉 ⊳ Q→ P ⊳ Q.
Proof. Suppose τ |= P . From the hypothesis, we know that, for any σ, if τ ↓ σ, then there
exists τ ′ such that hd τ ′ = σ and τ ′ |= Q. Using this, we build a trace τ ′ such that τ ′ |=τ Q,
by traversing τ and invoking the hypothesis when the last state of τ is hit.
Proposition 4.10. For any s, U and P , if {U} s {P} in the trace-based Hoare logic, then
for any m : nat ,W and R such that 〈W 〉 ∗∗ P ⊳ R, {U ∧W ∧ ⌈P ∗∗R⌉m} s {Last (〈W 〉 ∗∗
P ) ∧ ⌈R⌉m} is derivable in the total-correctness Hoare logic with while-rel.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of {U} s {P}. We show the main cases of sequence
and while.
• s = s0; s1: We are given as the induction hypotheses that, for any m0,W0 and R0 such
that (〈W0〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈V 〉) ⊳ R0, we have that
{U ∧W0 ∧ ⌈P ∗∗ 〈V 〉 ∗∗R0⌉m0} s0 {Last (〈W0〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈V 〉) ∧ ⌈R0⌉m0} (IH0)
and, for any m1,W1 and R1 such that (〈W1〉 ∗∗Q) ⊳ R1, we have that
{V ∧W1 ∧ ⌈Q ∗∗R1⌉m1} s1 {Last (〈W1〉 ∗∗Q) ∧ ⌈R1⌉m1}. (IH1)
We have to prove that, for any m,W and R such that
(〈W 〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗Q) ⊳ R, (H)
we have that
{U ∧W ∧ ⌈P ∗∗Q ∗∗R⌉m} s0; s1 {Last (〈W 〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗Q) ∧ ⌈R⌉m}.
Let V ′ = Last (〈W 〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈V 〉). We close the case by the derivation
.... (1) IH0m,W,Q ∗∗R
{U ∧W ∧ ⌈P ∗∗ 〈V 〉 ∗∗Q ∗∗R⌉m}s0
{V ′ ∧ ⌈Q ∗∗R⌉m}
{U ∧W ∧ ⌈P ∗∗Q ∗∗R⌉m}s0
{V ′ ∧ ⌈Q ∗∗R⌉m}
(3)
.... (2) IH1m,V
′, R
{V ∧ V ′ ∧ ⌈Q ∗∗R⌉m}s1
{Last (〈V ′〉 ∗∗Q) ∧ ⌈R⌉m}
{V ′ ∧ ⌈Q ∗∗R⌉m}s1
{Last (〈V ′〉 ∗∗Q) ∧ ⌈R⌉m}
(4)
{U ∧W ∧ ⌈P ∗∗Q ∗∗R⌉m} s0; s1 {Last (〈V
′〉 ∗∗Q) ∧ ⌈R⌉m}
{U ∧W ∧ ⌈P ∗∗Q ∗∗R⌉m} s0; s1 {Last (〈W 〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗Q) ∧ ⌈R⌉m}
(5)
(1) To invoke the induction hypothesis, we have to prove 〈W 〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈V 〉 ⊳ Q ∗∗ R. By
Corollary 3.9 and the hypothesis {V } s1 {Q}, we have that, for any σ such that σ |= V ,
there exists τ such that hd τ = σ and τ |= Q. This gives us 〈V 〉⊳Q. By Lemmata 3.6
(11) and 4.7, we have 〈Last (〈W 〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈V 〉)〉 ⊳ Q, therefore 〈W 〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈V 〉 ⊳Q by
Lemma 4.9. Now, for any τ , suppose τ |= 〈W 〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈V 〉. There exists τ ′ such that
τ ′ |=τ Q. We deduce τ
′ |= 〈W 〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈V 〉 ∗∗ Q. From the hypothesis H, we know
that there exists τ ′′ such that τ ′′ |=τ ′ R, therefore τ
′′ |=τ Q ∗∗R, as required.
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(2) To invoke the induction hypothesis, we have to prove 〈V ′〉∗∗Q⊳R, namely 〈Last (〈W 〉∗∗
P ∗∗ 〈V 〉)〉 ∗∗ Q ⊳ R. By Lemma 4.8, it suffices to show 〈W 〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈V 〉 ∗∗ Q ⊳ R,
which follows from the hypothesis (H), 〈W 〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈V 〉 ∗∗ Q |= 〈W 〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗ Q and
Lemma 4.7.
(3) ⌈P∗∗Q∗∗R⌉m |= ⌈P∗∗〈V 〉∗∗Q∗∗R⌉m follows from Lemma 4.6 and P∗∗〈V 〉∗∗Q∗∗R |=
P ∗∗Q ∗∗R.
(4) V ′ |= V ∧ V ′ holds because V ′ = Last (〈W 〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈V 〉) |= Last 〈V 〉 ⇔ V from
Lemmata 3.6 (10) and (11).
(5) We have
Last (〈V ′〉 ∗∗Q)
= Last (〈Last (〈W 〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈V 〉)〉 ∗∗Q)
⇔ Last (〈W 〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈V 〉 ∗∗Q) (by Lemma 3.6 (12))
|= Last (〈W 〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗Q)
• s = while e do st. We are given as the induction hypothesis that, for any mt, Wt and Rt
such that 〈Wt〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈I〉 ⊳ Rt,
{e ∧ I ∧Wt ∧ ⌈P ∗∗ 〈I〉 ∗∗Rt⌉mt} st {Last (〈Wt〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈I〉) ∧ ⌈Rt⌉mt}. (IH)
We also know U |= I and {e ∧ I} s {P ∗∗ 〈I〉}, the latter of which gives us
{I} while e do s {〈I〉2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉}. (4.1)
We have to prove that, for any m,W and R such that
〈W 〉 ∗∗ 〈I〉2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉 ⊳ R, (H)
we have that
{U ∧W ∧ ⌈〈U〉2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉 ∗∗R⌉m}
while e do st {Last (〈W 〉 ∗∗ 〈U〉
2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉) ∧ ⌈R⌉m}.
Let
J0 = Last (〈U ∧W 〉
2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)†),
and
J1 n = ⌈(P ∗∗ 〈I〉
2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉 ∗∗R⌉n,
and
Q = 〈I〉2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉 ∗∗R.
We first prove that, for all n,
{e ∧ J0 ∧ J1 n} st {∃k. k < n ∧ J0 ∧ J1 k} (4.2)
holds by case analysis on n.
– n = 0. We prove e∧J0∧J1 0 |= false. Then, by the derivability of {false} s {U} for any
s and U in the total correctness Hoare logic, we obtain (4.2). Suppose σ0 |= e∧J0∧J1 0
holds. From σ0 |= J0, there exists a trace τ0 such that τ0 |= 〈U ∧W 〉
2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)†
and τ0 ↓ σ0. By Lemma 3.6 (14), σ0 |= J0 and U |= I give us σ0 |= I. Applying
Corollary 3.9 to (4.1), we know that there exists a trace τ1 such that hd τ1 = σ0 and
σ0 :: τ1 |= 〈I〉
2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉. Hence, we have τ1 |= 〈I〉 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉
2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉.
We deduce
τ0 ++ τ1 |= 〈W 〉 ∗∗ 〈I〉
2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉,
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where ++ was defined by corecursion by
〈σ〉++ τ = τ σ :: τ ++ τ ′ = σ :: (τ ++ τ ′).
The assumption H gives us a trace τ2 such that τ2 |=τ0++τ1 R. Since τ0 is finite, we
find the suffix τ3 of τ2 such that τ3 |= (P ∗∗ 〈I〉
2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉 ∗∗R by dropping the first n
elements from τ2, where n is the length of τ0. We also have hd τ3 = σ0 by construction.
The trace τ3 cannot be a singleton 〈σ0〉, which would imply σ0 |= e and σ0 |= ¬e.
Contradiction by σ0 |= J1 0.
– n 6= 0. We invoke the induction hypothesis IH on n, J0 and Q. To do so, we have to
prove
〈J0〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈I〉 ⊳ Q. (4.3)
By Lemma 4.8, it suffices to prove (〈U ∧W 〉2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈I〉) ⊳ Q. From
Corollary 3.9 and (4.1), we deduce 〈I〉 ⊳ 〈I〉2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉, hence 〈U ∧W 〉2 ∗∗
(P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈I〉 ⊳ 〈I〉2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉 by Lemma 4.9. This together with
the hypothesis (H) proves (4.3).
We have now proved
{e ∧ I ∧ J0 ∧ ⌈P ∗∗ 〈I〉 ∗∗Q⌉n} st {Last (〈J0〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈I〉) ∧ ⌈Q⌉n}.
We close the case by invoking the consequence rule with
e ∧ J0 ∧ J1 n
= e ∧ J0 ∧ ⌈(P ∗∗ 〈I〉
2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉 ∗∗R⌉n
|= e ∧ J0 ∧ ⌈P ∗∗ 〈I〉
2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉 ∗∗R⌉n
(by Lemma 3.6 (5))
⇔ e ∧ J0 ∧ ⌈P ∗∗ 〈I〉 ∗∗ 〈I〉
2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉 ∗∗R⌉n
(as 〈I〉2 ⇔ 〈I〉 ∗∗ 〈I〉2)
= e ∧ Last (〈U ∧W 〉2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)†) ∧ ⌈P ∗∗ 〈I〉 ∗∗Q⌉n
⇔ e ∧ I ∧ Last (〈U ∧W 〉2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)†) ∧ ⌈P ∗∗ 〈I〉 ∗∗Q⌉n
(by Lemma 3.6 (14) and U |= I)
= e ∧ I ∧ J0 ∧ ⌈P ∗∗ 〈I〉 ∗∗Q⌉n,
and
Last (〈J0〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈I〉) ∧ ⌈Q⌉n
= Last (〈Last (〈U ∧W 〉2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)†)〉 ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈I〉) ∧ ⌈Q⌉n
|= Last (〈U ∧W 〉2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈I〉) ∧ ⌈Q⌉n
(by Lemma 3.6 (12))
⇔ Last (〈U ∧W 〉2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈I〉2) ∧ ⌈Q⌉n (1)
|= Last (〈U ∧W 〉2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)†) ∧ ⌈Q⌉n (by Lemma 3.6 (5))
= J0 ∧ ⌈〈I〉
2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉 ∗∗R⌉n
|= J0 ∧ ⌈(P ∗∗ 〈I〉
2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉 ∗∗R⌉(n − 1) (2)
= J0 ∧ J1 (n− 1)
|= ∃k. k < n ∧ J0 ∧ J1 k
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(1) Given a trace τ and a state σ satisfying 〈U ∧W 〉2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈I〉 and
τ ↓ σ, we have duplast τ |= 〈U ∧W 〉2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ P ∗∗ 〈I〉2 and duplast τ ↓ σ.
(2) From Lemma 3.6 (14) and U |= I, we know, for any σ, if σ |= J0, namely σ |=
Last (〈U∧W 〉2∗∗(P∗∗〈I〉2)†), then σ |= I. Suppose σ |= J0∧⌈〈I〉
2∗∗(P∗∗〈I〉2)†∗∗〈¬e〉∗∗
R⌉n. It suffices to prove that, for any τ , if hd τ = σ and τ |= (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉 ∗∗R,
then τ |= len (n− 1). We have σ :: τ |= 〈I〉2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉 ∗∗R, which together
with σ |= ⌈〈I〉2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉 ∗∗ R⌉n yields σ :: τ |= len n. This gives us
τ |= len (n − 1).
By the rule for the while-statement by taking J n to be J0 ∧ J1 n, we deduce
{J0 ∧ J1m} while e do st {∃k. k ≤ m ∧ J0 ∧ J1 k ∧ ¬e}
We have
U ∧W ∧ ⌈〈U〉2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉 ∗∗R⌉m
|= Last (〈U ∧W 〉2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)†) ∧ ⌈(P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉 ∗∗R⌉m
= J0 ∧ J1m
and
∃k. k ≤ m ∧ J0 ∧ J1 k ∧ ¬e
|= J0 ∧ J1m ∧ ¬e (by monotonicity of J1)
= Last (〈U ∧W 〉2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)†) ∧ ⌈(P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉 ∗∗R⌉m ∧ ¬e
|= Last (〈W 〉 ∗∗ 〈U〉2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉) ∧ ⌈R⌉m
So, by consequence, we have
{U ∧W ∧ ⌈〈U〉2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉 ∗∗R⌉m}
while e do st {Last (〈W 〉 ∗∗ 〈U〉
2 ∗∗ (P ∗∗ 〈I〉2)† ∗∗ 〈¬e〉) ∧ ⌈R⌉m}
as we wanted.
Corollary 4.11. For any s, U and P , if {U} s {P} in the trace-based Hoare logic, then
{U ∧ ∃m. ⌈P ⌉m} s {Last P} is derivable in the total-correctness Hoare logic with while-rel.
Proof. From Proposition 4.10 by taking W = true, R = 〈true〉 and then invoking the
consequence rule and the admissible rule
∀m. {U} s {Z}
{∃m.U} s {∃m.Z}
of the total-correctness Hoare logic.
4.3. Discussion. Let us now discuss the transformations from and to the total-correctness
Hoare logic. We used two different rules for while. In the forward direction (the embedding),
we used while-fun, whereas in the backward direction (the projection), we used while-rel.
With while-rel, the total-correctness Hoare logic is complete, constructively. In par-
ticular, while-fun is weaker and straightforwardly derivable from while-rel by instantiating
J n = (I ∧ t = n).
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In the converse direction, attempts to derive while-fun from while-rel constructively
meet several problems. It is natural to define the invariant I as I = ∃m.J m. The variant
t should then be defined as
t =
{
the least k such that J k if ∃m.J m
0 (or any other natural) if ¬∃m.J m
This is a sensible classical definition. But constructively, there are two issues with it. First,
in the first case, we must be able to find the least k such that J k. We have a bound for this
search, which is given by the witness m0 of ∃m.J m. But in order to search, we must be
able to decide where J k or ¬J k for each k < m0, which requires J to be decidable. Second,
in order to choose between the two cases, we must be able to decide whether ∃m.J m or
¬∃m.J m, which is generally impossible.
These issues show that while-fun is not fine-tuned for constructive reasoning. To for-
mulate a more sensitive rule, we may notice that we only ever need t in contexts where
I = ∃m.J m can be assumed to hold. So instead of I ∧ t = n we could use Σp : I. t p = n
making the variant t depend on the proof of the invariant. The corresponding modified rule
is
∀n : nat {e ∧ Σp : I. t p = n} st {Σp : I. t p < n}
{Σp : I. t p = m} while e do st {Σp : I. t p ≤ m ∧ ¬e}
while-fun′
Ideally, we would like to use while-rel (or some interderivable rule) both in the trans-
formations to and from the trace-based Hoare logic. But in the forward direction we have
been unable to do it. We conjecture the reason to be that the state-based total-correctness
triples and trace-based (partial-correctness) triples express different types of propositions
about the underlying evaluation relations: total-correctness triples are about existence of
a final state satisfying the postcondition, whereas partial-correctness triples are about all
traces produced satisfying the postcondition. This discrepancy shows itself also in our back-
ward transformation: we need to invoke the totality of the trace-based evaluation relation.
5. Examples
Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 show that our trace-based logic is expressive enough to perform
the same type of analyses that the state-based partial or total correctness Hoare logics can
perform. However, the expressiveness of our logic goes beyond that of the partial and the
total correctness Hoare logics. In this section, we demonstrate this by a series of examples.
We adopt the usual notational convention that any occurrence of a variable in a state
predicate represents the value of the variable in the state, e.g., a state predicate x+ y = 7
abbreviates λσ. σ x+ σ y = 7.
5.1. Unbounded total search. Since we work in a constructive underlying logic, we can
distinguish between termination of a run, finite, and nondivergence, ¬infinite. For instance,
any unbounded nonpartial search fails to be terminating but is nonetheless nondivergent.
This example is inspired by Markov’s principle: (¬∀n.¬B n) → ∃n.B n for any decid-
able predicate B on natural numbers, i.e., a predicate satisfying ∀n.B n ∨ ¬B n. Markov’s
principle is a classical tautology, but is not valid constructively. This implies we cannot
constructively prove a statement s that searches a natural number n satisfying B by suc-
cessively checking whether B 0, B 1, B 2, . . . to be terminating. In other words, we cannot
constructively derive a total correctness judgement for s. The assumption ¬∀n. ¬B n only
26 K. NAKATA AND T. UUSTALU
guarantees that B is not false everywhere, therefore the search cannot diverge; indeed, we
can constructively prove that s is nondivergent in our logic.
We assume given a decidable predicate B on natural numbers and an axiom
B noncontradictory: ¬∀n.¬B n stating that B is not false everywhere. Therefore running
the statement
Search ≡ x := 0;while ¬B x do x := x+ 1
cannot diverge: this would contradict B noncontradictory. In Proposition 5.3 we prove that
any trace produced by running Search is nondivergent and B x holds of the last state.
We define a family of trace predicates cofinally n coinductively as follows:
σ x = n B n
σ :: 〈σ〉 |= cofinally n
σ x = n ¬B n τ |= cofinally (n+ 1)
σ :: σ :: τ |= cofinally n
cofinally n is a setoid predicate.
A crucial observation is that, in the presence of B noncontradictory, cofinally 0 is
stronger than nondivergent:
Lemma 5.1. cofinally 0 |= ¬infinite.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove that, for any τ , τ |= cofinally 0 and τ |= infinite are contra-
dictory. Suppose there is a trace τ such that τ |= cofinally 0 and τ |= infinite. Then by
induction on n we can show that, for any n, there is a trace τ ′ such that τ ′ |= cofinally n
and τ ′ |= infinite. But whenever this holds for some τ ′ and n, then ¬B n. Hence we also
have ∀n.¬Bn. But this contradicts B noncontradictory .
It is straightforward to prove that, if τ satisfies cofinally 0, then its last state (if exists)
satisfies B at x. (We refer to the program variable x in the statement Search.)
Lemma 5.2. cofinally 0 |= true ∗∗ 〈B x〉.
Proof. We prove the following condition by coinduction, from which the lemma follows: for
any n, τ , if τ |= cofinally n, then τ |=τ 〈B x〉.
Proposition 5.3. {true} Search {(true ∗∗ 〈B x〉) ∧ ¬infinite}.
Proof. A sketch of the derivation is given in Figure 5. (At several places we have applied
the consequence rule silently.)
(1) We use Lemmata 5.1 and 5.2.
(2) x is incremented by one in every iteration until B holds at x. 〈x = 0〉2 ∗∗ ((¬B x)[x 7→
x+ 1] ∗∗ 〈true〉2)† ∗∗ 〈B x〉 |= cofinally 0 follows from the definition of cofinally . (It is
proved by coinduction.)
(3) We take true as the loop invariant.
5.2. Liveness. As the similarity of our assertion language to the interval temporal logic
suggests, we can specify and prove liveness properties. In Proposition 5.5, we prove that
the statement
x := 0;while true do x := x+ 1
eventually sets the value of x to n for any n : nat at some point.
The example is simple but sufficient to demonstrate core techniques used to prove
liveness properties of more practical examples. For instance, imagine that assignment to
x involves a system call, with the assigned value as the argument. It is straightforward to
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{true} x := 0 {true[x 7→ 0]}
{¬B x} x := x+ 1 {(¬B x)[x 7→ x+ 1]}
{x = 0} while ¬B x do x := x+ 1
{〈x = 0〉2 ∗∗ ((¬B x)[x 7→ x+ 1] ∗∗ 〈true〉2)† ∗∗ 〈B x〉}
(3)
❊❊
{x = 0} while ¬B x do x := x+ 1 {cofinally 0}
(2)
{true} x := 0;while ¬B x do x := x+ 1 {true[x 7→ 0] ∗∗ cofinally 0}
{true} x := 0;while ¬B x do x := x+ 1 {(true ∗∗ 〈B x〉) ∧ ¬infinite}
(1)
Figure 5: Derivation of {true} Search {(true ∗∗ 〈B x〉) ∧ ¬infinite}
{true} x := 0 {true[x 7→ 0]}
{true} x := x+ 1 {true[x 7→ x+ 1]}
{x = 0} while true do x := x+ 1
{〈x = 0〉2 ∗∗ (true[x 7→ x+ 1] ∗∗ 〈true〉2)† ∗∗ 〈false〉}
(3)
❊❊
{x = 0} while true do x := x+ 1 {eventually n}
(2)
{true} x := 0;while true do x := x+ 1 {true[x 7→ 0] ∗∗ eventually n}
{true} x := 0;while true do x := x+ 1 {finite ∗∗ 〈x = n〉 ∗∗ true}
(1)
Figure 6: Derivation of {true} x := 0;while true do x := x+ 1 {finite ∗∗ 〈x = n〉 ∗∗ true}
enrich traces to record such special events, and we can then apply the same proof technique
to prove the statement eventually performs the system call with n as the argument for any
n.
For every n, we define inductively a trace predicate eventually n stating that a state σ
in which the value of x is n is eventually reached by finitely traversing τ :
σ x = n
〈σ〉 |= eventually n
σ x = n
σ :: τ |= eventually n
τ |= eventually n
σ :: τ |= eventually n
If τ satisfies eventually n, then it has a finite prefix followed by a state that maps x to n.
Lemma 5.4. For any n, τ , if τ |= eventually n then τ |= finite ∗∗ 〈x = n〉 ∗∗ true.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of eventually n.
Proposition 5.5. For any n : nat, {true} x := 0;while true do x := x+ 1 {finite ∗∗ 〈x =
n〉 ∗∗ true}.
Proof. A sketch of the derivation is given in Figure 6.
(1) We use Lemma 5.4.
(2) x is incremented by one in every iteration, starting from zero. Each iteration is finite:
the length of the trace of each iteration is invariably two. x must eventually become n
after a finite number of iterations for any n.
(3) We take true as the invariant.
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5.3. Weak trace equivalence. The last example is inspired by a notion of weak trace
equivalence: two traces are weakly equivalent if they are bisimilar by identifying a finite
number of consecutive identical states with a single state. It is conceivable that (strong)
bisimilarity is too strong for some applications and one needs weak bisimilarity. For instance,
we may want to prove that the observable behavior, such as the colist of i/o events of a poten-
tially diverging run, is bisimilar to a particular colist of i/o events. Then we must be able to
collapse a finite number of non-observable internal steps. We definitely should not collapse
an infinite number of internal steps, otherwise we would end up concluding that a statement
performing an i/o operation after a diverging run, e.g., while true do skip; print “hello”, is
observably equivalent to a statement immediately performing the same i/o operation, e.g.,
print “hello”.
In this subsection, we prove that the trace produced by running the statement
while true do (y := x; (while y 6= 0 do y := y − 1);x := x+ 1)
is weakly bisimilar to the ascending sequence of natural numbers 0 :: 1 :: 2 :: 3 :: . . ., by
projecting the value of x, assuming that x is initially 0. The statement differs from that
of the previous subsection in that it “stutters” for a finite but unbounded number of steps,
i.e., while y 6= 0 do y := y − 1, before the next assignment to x happens.
This exercise is instructive in that we need to formalize weak trace equivalence in our
constructive underlying logic. We do so by supplying an inductive predicate τ
∗
 τ ′ stating
that τ ′ is obtained from τ by dropping finitely many elements from the beginning, until
the first state with a different value of x is encountered, and a coinductive trace predicate
up n stating that the given trace is weakly bisimilar to the ascending sequence of natural
numbers starting at n, by projecting the value of x. Formally:
σ x = hd τ x τ
∗
 τ ′
σ :: τ
∗
 τ ′
σ x 6= hd τ x τ ≈ τ ′
σ :: τ
∗
 τ ′
σ x = n σ :: τ
∗
 τ ′ τ ′ |= up (n+ 1)
σ :: τ |= up n
These definitions are tailored to our example. But a more general weak trace equivalence
can be defined similarly [16]. We note that our formulation is not the only one possible nor
the most elegant. In particular, with a logic supporting nesting of induction into coinduction
as primitive [6], there is no need to separate the definition into an inductive part, τ
∗
 τ ′,
and a coinductive part, up n. Yet our formulation is amenable for formalization in Coq.
We also use an auxiliary trace predicate 〈x〉∗ that is true of a finite trace in which the
value of x does not change and is non-negative at the end and hence everywhere. It is
defined inductively as follows:
x ≥ 0
〈σ〉 |= 〈x〉∗
σ x = hd τ x τ |= 〈x〉∗
σ :: τ |= 〈x〉∗
Proposition 5.6. {x = 0} s {up 0} where s ≡ while true do (y := x; (while y 6= 0 do y :=
y − 1);x := x+ 1).
Proof. A sketch of the derivation is given in Figure 7.
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{x ≥ 0} y := x {(x ≥ 0)[y 7→ x]}
{y 6= 0 ∧ y ≥ 0} y := y − 1 {y > 0[y 7→ y − 1] ∗∗ 〈y ≥ 0〉}
{x ≥ 0 ∧ y ≥ 0} while y 6= 0 do y := y − 1
{〈x ≥ 0 ∧ y ≥ 0〉2 ∗∗ ((y > 0)[y 7→ y − 1] ∗∗ 〈y ≥ 0〉2)† ∗∗ 〈y = 0〉}
(4)
{x ≥ 0 ∧ y ≥ 0} while y 6= 0 do y := y − 1 {〈x〉∗}
(3)
❊❊ {x ≥ 0} x := x+ 1 {(x ≥ 0)[x 7→ x+ 1]}
{x ≥ 0 ∧ y ≥ 0} (while y 6= 0 do y := y − 1);x := x+ 1
{〈x〉∗ ∗∗ (x ≥ 0)[x 7→ x+ 1]}
{x ≥ 0} y := x; (while y 6= 0 do y := y − 1);x := x+ 1 {〈x〉∗ ∗∗ (x ≥ 0)[x 7→ x+ 1] ∗∗ 〈x ≥ 0〉}
{x = 0} while true do (y := x; (while y 6= 0 do y := y − 1);x := x+ 1)
{〈x = 0〉2 ∗∗ (〈x〉∗ ∗∗ (x ≥ 0)[x 7→ x+ 1] ∗∗ 〈x ≥ 0〉2)† ∗∗ 〈false〉}
(2)
{x = 0} while true do (y := x; (while y 6= 0 do y := y − 1);x := x+ 1) {up 0}
(1)
Figure 7: Derivation of {x = 0} s {up 0}
(1) x is incremented by one in every iteration, starting from zero, and the loop is iterated
forever. Each iteration is finite, although globally unbounded. So x must increase
forever.
(2) We take x ≥ 0 as the invariant.
(3) y is decremented by one in every iteration, starting from a non-negative number. It
must become zero after a finite number of iterations. x does not change.
(4) We take y ≥ 0 as the invariant.
6. Related work
Coinductive big-step semantics for nontermination have been considered by Cousot and
Cousot [5] and by Leroy and Grall [11, 12] (in the context of the CompCert project, which
is a major demonstration of feasibility of certified compilation). Cousot and Cousot [5] study
fixpoints on bi-semantic domains, partitioned into domains of terminating and diverging be-
haviors; they prove a specific fixed-point theorem for such domains (bi-induction), and then
produce a bi-inductive big-step semantics for lambda-calculus (avoiding some duplication
of rules between what would otherwise be distinct inductive and coinductive definitions
of terminating resp. diverging evaluation). Leroy and Grall [12] investigate two big-step
semantics approaches for lambda-calculus. The first, based on Cousot and Cousot [4], has
different evaluation relations for terminating and diverging runs, one inductive (with finite
traces), the other coinductive (with infinite traces). To conclude that any program either
terminates or diverges, they need the law of excluded middle (amounting to decidability
of the halting problem), and, as a result, cannot prove the standard small-step semantics
sound wrt. the big-step semantics constructively. The second approach, applied in [2], uses
a coinductively defined evaluation relation with possibly infinite traces. While-loops are
not ensured to be progressive in terms of growing traces (an infinite number of consecutive
silent small steps may be collapsed) and this leads to problems.
Some other works on coinductive big-step semantics include Glesner [7] and Nestra [18,
19]. In these it is accepted that a program evaluation can somehow continue after an infinite
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number of small steps. With Glesner, this seems to have been a curious unintended side-
effect of the design, which she was experimenting with just for the interest of it. Nestra
developed a nonstandard semantics with transfinite traces on purpose in order to obtain a
soundness result for a widely used slicing transformation that is unsound standardly (can
turn nonterminating runs into terminating runs).
Our trace-based coinductive big-step semantics [17] was heavily inspired by Capretta’s [3]
modelling of nontermination in a constructive setting similar to ours. Rather than using
coinductive possibly infinite traces, he works with a coinductive notion of a possibly in-
finitely delayed value (for statements, this corresponds to delaying the final state). The
categorical basis appears in Rutten’s work [21]. But Rutten only studied the classical set-
ting (any program terminates or not), where a delayed state collapses to a choice of between
a state or a designated token signifying nontermination.
A general categorical account of small-step trace-based semantics has been given by
Hasuo et al. [9].
While Hoare logics for big-step semantics based on inductive, finite traces have been
considered earlier (to reason about traces of terminating runs), Hoare or VDM-style logics
for reasoning about properties of nonterminating runs do not seem to have been studied
before, with one exception, see below. Neither do we in fact know about dynamic logic
or KAT (Kleene algebra with tests) approaches that would have assertions about possibly
infinite traces. Rather, nonterminating runs have been typically reasoned about in temporal
logics like LTL and CTL∗ or in interval temporal logic [14, 8]. These are however essentially
different in spirit by their “endogeneity”: assertions are made about traces in a fixed tran-
sition system rather than traces of runs of different programs. Notably, however, interval
temporal logic has connectives similar to ours—in fact they were a source of inspiration for
our design.
Hofmann and Pavlova [10] consider a VDM-style logic with finite trace assertions that
are applied to all finite prefixes of the trace of a possibly nonterminating run of a program.
This logic allows reasoning about safety, but not liveness. We expect that we should be
able to embed a logic like this in ours.
7. Conclusions
We have presented a sound and complete Hoare logic for the coinductive trace-based big-
step semantics of While. The logic naturally extends both the standard state-based partial
and total correctness Hoare logics. Its design may be exploratory at this stage—in the
sense that one might wish to consider alternative choices of primitive connectives. We see
our logic as a viable unifying foundational framework facilitating translations from more
applied logics.
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Appendix A. State-based partial correctness and total correctness Hoare
logics
The figures below give the rules of the standard, state-based partial correctness and total
correctness Hoare logics in the form used in Section 4.
{U [e/x]} x := e {U} {U} skip {U}
{U} s0 {V } {V } s1 {Z}
{U} s0; s1 {Z}
{e ∧ U} st {Z} {¬e ∧ U} sf {Z}
{U} if e then st else sf {Z}
{e ∧ I} st {I}
{I} while e do st {I ∧ ¬e}
∀z. {U} s {V }
{∃z. U} s {∃z. V }
U |= U ′ {U ′} s {Z ′} Z ′ |= Z
{U} s {Z}
Figure 8: Inference rules of partial-correctness Hoare logic
{U [e/x]} x := e {U} {U} skip {U}
{U} s0 {V } {V } s1 {Z}
{U} s0; s1 {Z}
{e ∧ U} st {Z} {¬e ∧ U} sf {Z}
{U} if e then st else sf {Z}
∀n : nat {e ∧ I ∧ t = n} st {I ∧ t < n}
{I ∧ t = m} while e do st {I ∧ t ≤ m ∧ ¬e}
while-fun
alt.
∀n : nat {e ∧ J n} st {∃k. k < n ∧ J k}
{J m} while e do st {∃k. k ≤ m ∧ J k ∧ ¬e}
while-rel
∀z. {U} s {V }
{∃z. U} s {∃z. V }
U |= U ′ {U ′} s {Z ′} Z ′ |= Z
{U} s {Z}
Figure 9: Inference rules of total-correctness Hoare logic
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